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ECHOES OF A DYING STATE: PERESTROIKA PROPAGANDA IN
THE SOVIET FOREIGN PRESS
By Matthew Brown

“Perestroika means mass initiative. It is the comprehensive development of democracy, socialist self-government, encouragement
of initiative and creative endeavor, improved order and discipline,
more glasnost, criticism and self-criticism in all spheres of our
society. It is utmost respect for the individual and consideration
for personal dignity.”230
The collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of one of the most tumultuous
and volatile periods in modern history. The Soviet Union was not destroyed by
a foreign military invasion, nor was it torn apart by civil war. The events that
resulted in one of the most powerful countries the world has ever seen literally
signing itself out of existence were official government policy, heavily promoted
by the Communist Party as the pinnacle of Soviet ideology, and praised by the
Soviet intelligentsia as a clear path to a prosperous society. The perestroika
and glasnost reforms, instituted under Mikhail Gorbachev, represent the final
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chapter of the Soviet Union’s history before its collapse in 1991 and the splitting of the Union into 15 post-Soviet republics. How did such promising and
widely acclaimed plans destroy the very society on which they were built? The
answer to this question lies in how the Soviet Union mobilized its citizens to
action; in propaganda.
The reforms began with Gorbachev’s assumption to the position of the
General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March of
1985. Gorbachev’s vision for the future of the Soviet Union involved a public examination of the social, economic, and political issues that plagued the
country at the time, while simultaneously developing programs to prepare the
Soviet Union for future development in all spheres of life.231 The term perestroika was adopted to define the task at hand. Perestroika translates to English
as “restructuring”, underlining that a massive change was needed within the
Communist Party and the Soviet Union, and not simply a handful of minor
adjustments. This proposed restructuring of the entire Soviet system and society was to be driven by two concepts: glasnost (openness) and demokratizatsia
(democratization), ultimately resulting in the revitalization of the communist
party and the Soviet Union.232 The “openness” of glasnost meant that issues
such as the shortcomings of the Soviet planned economy, corruption within
the Communist Party and state bureaucracies, ideological disputes, and foreign
policy would no longer be covered up, but openly discussed and solutions
sought. Moving hand-in-hand with the dialogue and self-criticism inspired
by glasnost, democratization worked to alleviate totalitarian elements in Soviet
society and politics by replacing the appointment system with elections for state
leadership positions and factory management.
Scholarly writing about the 1980s reforms in the Soviet Union tends to
fall into two distinct camps. The type of writing that emerged first is largely
focused on the role of Mikhail Gorbachev as the chief orchestrator of reform.
Titles including The Gorbachev Phenomenon, Can Gorbachev Change the Soviet
Union?, and Gorbachev’s Revolution illustrate the academic fascination with the
man, and hold him as a figure to guide their discourse and analysis of perestroika
231
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and glasnost.233 They view Gorbachev’s efforts as in earnest, though perhaps
too ambitious or with little chance of success.234 Though this style persisted
beyond the collapse of the Soviet Union, it first emerged out of a necessity
to discuss the reforms, despite the absence of quantifiable results while the
reforms were underway. Following the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, more
complex arguments emerged. With knowledge of how Gorbachev’s programs
played out, it became possible to widen one’s perspective on the reforms with
information about how different factions of the Soviet government and public
responded to the changes and how these reactions ultimately led to the end
of the Soviet state. These pieces take the internal politics of the Soviet Union
into account, along with public opinion and international relations. While
presenting the multifaceted nature of perestroika and glasnost and the wide
effect of the reforms, these later works hold a general consensus that the rise of
nationalism in the Soviet Republics (in the wake of perestroika’s restructuring
initiatives) is the major reason for collapse.235
A theme that features heavily within both major types of literature is the
legacy of Joseph Stalin. Be it a focus on Gorbachev’s final undoing of Stalin,
or the role that Stalinism played in holding the Soviet Union together, the
argument remains the same: the perestroika reforms represented a move away
from Stalin’s authoritarian command structure that persisted since his death
in 1953, and thus, shook Soviet society to its very core. Susanne Sternthal, in
her book Gorbachev’s Reforms: De-Stalinization through Demilitarization, argues
that Josef Stalin is responsible for the various problems that Mikhail Gorbachev
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outlined upon his ascent to power.236 In this same vein, Elie Kedourie argues that
Stalinism is what held the Soviet Republics together, and that with Gorbachev’s
de-Stalinization, the Republics turned to nationalism and the Union dissolved.237
The claim that Stalin is responsible for the state of the Soviet Union that
Gorbachev inherited is a valid one. A brief survey of Soviet history supports this
argument. Stalin’s legacy includes the bureaucratization of the Soviet Union,
and the militarization of Soviet society and foreign policy under a totalitarian
state. While centralization of state controls may have been justified in his own
time by the need to industrialize and the inevitability of preparing for and
fighting the Second World War, Stalin established precedents that persisted in
Soviet leadership well beyond his death.238 Perhaps one of the most damaging
legacies of Stalin is the defense-first mindset he initiated. Due to what he saw
as capitalist (and during the Second World War, fascist) encirclement, Stalin
devoted the majority of the country’s resources and capabilities to preparing
for what he saw as an inevitable war. This resulted in a centralized system of
state command that permeated not only economics, but also political and
social life with the Communist Party (and all too often, Stalin himself ) as
the sole source of authority.239 Having the country on a perpetual war-path
against ideological “enemies,” internal and external, meant the justification of
suppressing political opponents, the direct control of the Soviet Union’s still
budding industrial system, and an openly hostile foreign policy. All aspects
of life, social, economic, and intellectual, were politicized and directed by the
state and its narrow interpretation of Marxist-Leninist ideology.
Following the death of Stalin, attempts were made by Nikita Khrushchev to
reduce spending on the military, increase the quality and quantity of consumer
products, and adapt Soviet policy to the new social and economic realities
of the post-war world.240 While the Khrushchev era did indeed see a thaw
in international relations and some internal social and economic reforms,
Communist Party conservatives led by Leonid Brezhnev ultimately ousted
him from power, returning to heavy-handed Stalinist style governance. As
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historian Yuri Afanasyev states, regarding the period between Khrushchev and
Gorbachev, “The intellectual and ideological stagnation of those years was worse
than the economic stagnation.”241 Stalin’s heavily centralized and bureaucratic
party and government had effectively transcended his own death, reforms of
his successor, and remained the status quo of the Soviet system for another 20
years until Mikhail Gorbachev introduced plans for far-reaching and radical
changes.
Outside of the Gorbachev-focused writing and the writing dealing more
directly with the collapse of the Soviet Union, there are authors that make
arguments that are undoubtedly in the minority. A particularly interesting,
though highly dubious claim is that the reforms themselves were nothing but
propaganda, designed to gain Western financial aid for an already collapsing
system.242 While propaganda did feature heavily in the portrayals of perestroika
and glasnost, the idea that the reforms themselves were part of some ploy to
trick the West out of a full victory in the Cold War is laughable. It ignores the
complex nature of both propaganda and the reforms.
The vast majority of propaganda studies revolve around the analysis of psychological techniques and rhetorical devices propagandists utilize in their craft,
and suffer from a definition of propaganda that lends little to more sophisticated
scholarship. These types of writing typically result in lists of notable tactics,
case studies detailing multiple historical examples, and methods readers can
employ to challenge propaganda when they encounter it. Scholars who have
published works to this effect include D. Lincoln Harter, Edward L. Bernays,
and Karen Dovring.243 Studies of this type exist for the explicit purpose of
exploring propaganda for its own sake, as a standalone phenomenon. They
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view propaganda as a tool for those in power who wish to deliberately and
maliciously alter the beliefs of others through deception and hidden agendas.244
This oversimplification is incredibly problematic when studying propaganda
for application in the field of history. It ignores the society from which the
propaganda emerges, and pigeonholes those who use propaganda as evil, creating moral judgments that are generally to be avoided in the writing of good
history.
One scholar that takes a more sophisticated approach in his work with
propaganda is Jacques Ellul. Ellul was a French academic, writing in fields that
spanned psychology, sociology, political science, and theology. A common theme
featured throughout his varied writings is society’s relationship with technology
and the social power that comes along with technological power. His focus on
social phenomena in relation to cultural and political power structures features
heavily in his work Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes.245 Ellul’s
Propaganda represents a distinct break from previous studies of the field, viewing
propaganda as a symptom of mass societies, rather than an intentional creation.
He states that to “delineate the real dimensions of propaganda we must always
consider it within the context of civilization.”246 Previous analyses did little of
this, relegating propaganda to a role in which it acts only as the tool of advertisers
and despots. He goes on to write, “Propaganda is a good deal less the political
weapon of regimes (it is that also) than the effect of a technological society that
embraces the entire man and tends to be a completely integrated society.”247
Here, Ellul makes clear that his take on propaganda is far more nuanced than
that of his predecessors. He views propaganda more as an unintentional result
of modern society, rather than something it deliberately creates. In this way,
propaganda can be seen as in indicator of a society in which the state permeates
multiple facets of life; in Ellul’s own words, a “completely integrated society.”
“Propaganda must be seen as situated at the center of the growing powers of the
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State and governmental and administrative techniques.”248 Further reiterating
and expanding on his argument, Ellul holds that as a state develops power and
expands its role in society, propaganda is a natural byproduct.
Ellul’s assertion that one must examine the social landscape to better understand propaganda is echoed in the discipline of history. One historian
whose ideas fit well with this idea of understanding the society producing the
propaganda is Moshe Lewin. Lewin, a noted scholar of Russian and Soviet
history, holds that to properly understand the Soviet Union, one must examine the social forces at work within it.249 It is not sufficient to simply view the
Soviet system as a government in control of its citizens. Lewin states that “one
needs to work from a conceptualization of the state that allows one to grasp
the connections between the political and other areas of social life.”250 This
type of view is especially important when examining the media produced by
the Soviet Union for the Western capitalist world. It is of limited use to label
propaganda of any type, Soviet included, as a mere tool of the state. As with any
aspect of government or political systems, the social forces behind propaganda
and state-produced media must be thoroughly examined and analyzed to truly
arrive at an understanding of how it functions.
The ways in which the Soviet Union depicted its own national project of
restructuring, when viewed in conjunction with Ellul’s theories, give valuable
insight to Soviet society. As the media in the Soviet Union was state owned and
directed, newspapers and periodicals coming out of the USSR reflect the official
program of the Soviet government and the Communist Party—supreme forces
in nearly every aspect of Soviet life at the time. While a study of material published for Soviet audiences is ideal, the author encounters a significant language
barrier preventing work with original Russian language sources. However, it
is possible to operate around this problem by examining Soviet publications
printed in English. This naturally leads to the questioning of just how similar
the content of Russian language publications is to those written in English. By
looking at material that has been translated from the domestic Soviet press of
the reform period and comparing it with English language pieces of the same
248
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time, it can be determined that the views expressed are indeed consistent with
each other.251 In fact, pieces printed in English language Soviet publications
were often listed as coming from newspapers and magazines circulating in the
Soviet Union, though obviously in translation. These realities firmly establish
the validity of examining English language publications as a means to explore
Soviet print media regarding the reforms. For the sake of this paper, the monthly
magazines Soviet Life and Sputnik will be used because of their close correlation
to works translated directly from Russian sources, as well as their inclusion of
pieces also read by Soviet audiences, allowing them to function to a certain
degree as substitutes for domestic, Russian language sources. Evaluating the
content of the pieces found within these magazines using Ellul’s propaganda
theories will shed light upon the society that produced them, expanding our
understanding of the perestroika and glasnost reforms and how they affected
the Soviet Union.
Representations of the perestroika and glasnost reforms in the Soviet English
language media fit the criteria for propaganda as established by Jacques Ellul on
multiple levels, thus revealing the centralized nature of the Soviet State and its
supreme power in society. The specific categories these works of propaganda can
be classified into and the psychological methods they utilize further illustrate
the character and intent of the reforms beyond their face values and reflect
the foundations that Soviet society was built on. As the reforms progressed,
pieces found in Soviet media began to drift farther from the characteristics
of propaganda, increasingly resembling more independent journalism and
works of opinion until the ultimate dissolution of the Soviet state. This shift
represents the successful implementation of certain aspects of the perestroika
and glasnost reforms, while simultaneously signifying their ultimate failure in
revitalizing the Soviet Union at all levels. The failure of the Soviet government
to create the society that it promised to its citizens resulted in the abandonment
251
Isaac J. Tarasulo, Gorbachev and Glasnost: Viewpoints from the Soviet Press (Wilmington:
Scholarly Resources Inc., 1989). This volume provides a great number of Soviet news articles
published in translation. They are taken from various Soviet domestic newspapers and magazines
and organized by subject matter. The pieces regarding perestroika are incredibly consistent with
the types of statements made in Soviet Life and Sputnik, justifying my use of those magazines as
representative of the Soviet press of the time. Perhaps the largest difference in content is found
in the treatment of Soviet pop culture, detailed much more in the domestic articles than those
destined for foreign readers,which tend to focus on fine arts and traditional culture.

96

Matthew Brown

of the social foundations that were used to advance the reform programs in
propaganda, resulting in the collapse of Soviet state power.
A Social Approach
When working within Ellul’s framework and a basic knowledge of Soviet history, one can easily understand why propaganda existed at the time Gorbachev
took power and why it continued to exist at the inception of the perestroika
and glasnost reforms. Gorbachev inherited a political system and society still
operating under the Stalinist structure of state controls. As Ellul stated, propaganda is a natural phenomenon that results from such completely integrated
and centralized societies. Though Gorbachev’s reforms aimed to restructure the
state completely and reduce the authoritarian influence it exerted over citizens’
lives, the fact remains that he and his reformers were emerging from and working
within a society already shaped by 50 years of supreme state power. It may seem
counter-intuitive that a state would develop propaganda to initiate a process of
decreasing state controls, however, the reforms were themselves state-organized
programs. As acts of policy, they would be powerless and ineffective without
the support of the public and a drive towards the active participation of the
masses. This returns us to what Ellul holds as the one shared characteristic of all
forms of propaganda: a will to action.252 The social circumstances necessary for
propaganda to exist already long in place, Gorbachev and his fellow reformers
utilized the existing state media infrastructure to promote and advance their
agenda of restructuring and openness with the public.
It is important to pause at this juncture and establish the nature of propaganda. The term, through decades of simplistic interpretations, has achieved
an extremely negative connotation. Propaganda is often seen by the general
public as an inherently malicious effort to distort the truth (or lie outright)
and bring about the propagandist’s ulterior or dubious motives by altering
what individuals believe. However, this view is flawed on several levels. First,
propaganda need not be malicious, nor need it contain lies. As stated above,
the one primary piece of criteria that determines whether or not something is
propaganda is the will to action. The ethical value of the action itself is not
relevant to the label of propaganda. This connects to the second issue with the
common misinterpretation of propaganda: it does not need to alter what an
252
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individual believes, but only move them towards action. Ellul calls this seeking
orthopraxy rather than orthodoxy.253
Having established the validity of this particular theoretical framework of
propaganda in relation to the state of society in the 1980s Soviet Union and
the basic implications it has on the definition of propaganda, we can begin
to look at more specific applications of the theory within Soviet publications
produced for the West. While Ellul largely attempts to avoid outlining specific
techniques of propaganda, he does outline different types of propaganda and
the characteristics they demonstrate.254 Exploring which characteristics are
present within the pieces of propaganda produced to advance reform not only
further validate their labeling as propaganda, but in turn add the understanding
of the reforms themselves and what their intended goals were.
Overt vs. Covert Propaganda: The Novosti Story
One distinction that Ellul draws is between covert and overt propaganda.255 The
names themselves leave little to the imagination. Covert propaganda actively
hides its aims and that it is intended to influence or push its audience towards
a given action.256 The other side of the situation is overt propaganda. Overt
propaganda does little or nothing to hide its source, and the actions it hopes
to elicit are made clear. Official propaganda ministries are a key identifying
factor for overt propaganda.
Soviet Life and Sputnik, the periodicals that this study is focused on, certainly fit within the definition of overt propaganda. Though intended to be
magazines that showcase Soviet current events and culture, there was never
any doubt that they were works of propaganda. Part of this classification
stems from the fact that both of these journals (as well as many others) were
published by Novosti. Agentstvo Pechanti Novosti (Novosti Press Agency, or
simply Novosti for short) was created in 1961 with the stated goal of publishing
“magazines, newspapers, and brochures designed to acquaint foreign readers
with the Soviet Union,” amongst other similar domestic duties.257 While this
may sound innocent enough, the reality of Novosti’s formation and activities
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255
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are quite revealing of its true function. The founders of Novosti came from
several other Soviet organizations, public in name, but working within state
sanctions. Members of the Union of Journalists, the Union of Writers, the
Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Contacts with Foreign
Countries, the National Union for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific
Knowledge, and other similar groups had a hand in the foundation and management of the agency, which was in turn staffed with intelligence officers and
graduates of KGB courses.258 While these groups had no official government
connection, the state of society did not allow for independent bodies to exist
without governmental approval. All publications were property of the people
(the Communist Party), and journalists were hand-picked and expected to
conform with and adhere to the party line. It is for this reason, although not
directly state sponsored, that Novosti can be considered as an organ of the
Soviet government with propaganda production as its chief goal. The manner
in which these facts differ from the stated purpose may lead observers to classify
Novosti as a producer of covert propaganda, however the state of the Soviet
press was no secret, and publications coming directly from Novosti carried with
them the stigma of state and party sponsorship.
An example of the close ties between Novosti and the Soviet state in the
Gorbachev era can be found in one of its board chairmen, Valentin Falin.
Elected to his position by the Council of Sponsors (leading members of the
aforementioned groups and unions) in March of 1986, Falin’s biography is very
telling of the types of individuals that controlled Novosti. Graduating from
the Moscow Institute of International Relations in 1950, Falin held various
executive posts within the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.259 From 19711979 he served as Soviet Ambassador to West Germany, as first deputy head of
a department in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee
from 1978-1983, and was awarded the Order of the October Revolution, three
Orders of the Red Banner of Labor, and other medals for his service to the
state and Communist Party.260 This lifetime of government work and intimate
connection with the Communist Party, publicly stated, only furthers the charge
that Novosti was overtly producing propaganda, though without explicitly
labeling itself as such.
258
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Soviet Life in particular leaves no doubt as to the overt nature of its propaganda. Published from 1956-1991, Soviet Life was part of an agreement between
the Soviet and American governments to allow for the limited distribution of
specific periodicals in each other’s countries (the American equivalent being
Amerika magazine).261 Soviet Life’s successor journal, Russian Life claims that
while the magazines were intended to contain general interest pieces from the
country of production, there was never a doubt that both functioned as mediums for the distribution of propaganda.262 The presence of such an agreement
between the two governments is itself an indicator that each party recognized
the reality of the situation.
The propaganda coming out of Novosti was not limited to English language
materials. Novosti was truly a massive agency. Publications were produced for
more than 110 countries, with official representatives present in 82 of them
maintaining connections with 140 major international news agencies.263 Some
of their materials were published in multiple languages, while others were
specifically targeting particular languages and nationalities. For instance, the
newspaper New Times was printed in Russian, English, Spanish, German, French,
and Arabic, containing broad-based stories and news coverage.264 Other publications including Far Eastern Affairs (printed in Russian, English and Japanese),
The Land of the Soviets (Syria), Al-Magallya (Egypt), and Fakel (Hungary) were
comprised of material specific to the region or culture in question.265 Novosti’s
gargantuan international scope, combined with its state-approved structure is
further testament to the fact that it was indeed a propaganda house and not a
simple news agency.
Vertical vs. Horizontal Propaganda: A Call to Action from Above
The voice developed in works of propaganda produces the next key distinction
that Ellul makes: vertical vs. horizontal propaganda. Vertical propaganda is, as
its name implies, top-down in orientation. The speaker is usually an authority
figure or someone “in the know” acting from a superior position of power.266
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This is the standard form of propaganda that comes to mind in most discussions
of the subject, representative of Nazi German, Stalinist, or American propaganda. The other, more uncommon type of propaganda in regards to voice is
horizontal propaganda. Horizontal propaganda comes from sources within a
given group and is directed towards a society where all members are (in theory
at least) equal in standing and knowledge.267 A propagandist in horizontal
systems acts more as a facilitator for discussion rather than from a position of
power, guiding his targets towards the intended action. According to Ellul,
this type of propaganda was found within Maoist China, where members of
the Communist Party were planted in various social groups, slowly influencing
said groups from inside.268
The propaganda of the perestroika and glasnost reforms is markedly vertical
in its orientation. Speeches from leading government officials, often Gorbachev
himself, and pieces written by various academics in high posts calling for reform, qualifying the necessity for change, or projecting the expected benefits
of the new course are very common. This coincides with the top-down nature
of the reforms themselves, as well as the media used to transmit information
about them. Had the movement been from the masses or a faction within
the government not backed by Gorbachev, it is highly unlikely that positive
information regarding them would be found in party-backed sources like Soviet
Life or Sputnik. As perestroika and glasnost were created and directed by the
government, it only makes sense that the most enthusiastic advocates of the
programs would be found within the government and associated bodies.
Soviet Life often published excerpts and summaries of various official speeches
given by Gorbachev regarding his proposed courses of action and the benefits
he claimed they would hold. These are clear examples of vertical propaganda,
coming from the head of the Soviet state directed towards not only his own
citizens but the world as a whole. The May 1986 issue of Soviet Life published
a summary of General Secretary Gorbachev’s political report speech given on
February 25, 1986 to the Twenty-Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union, titling it “We Look to the Future Confidently”; itself a quote
from the speech.269 “’Accelerating the country’s socioeconomic development is
267
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the key to solving all our problems—immediate and long-term, economic and
social, political and ideological, internal and external. It is the only way our
society can and must achieve a qualitatively new stage.’”270 Gorbachev acknowledges wide-spread problems within his country, and proposes his newly-revealed
plans for reform as the sole path to correcting them and moving into the future.
As leader of the USSR, he urges the population towards participating in the
process, and for foreign listeners/readers to accept his reforms as positive for all
mankind. At the conclusion of the piece, Gorbachev is paraphrased as assuring
his audience that “The Communists and the entire Soviet people support the
party’s policy of accelerating the country’s socioeconomic development and its
Program’s clear orientation toward communist construction and world peace.”271
Here Gorbachev has qualified his reforms by using his authority as head of the
Communist Party to his advantage, giving them the blessing of the party and
by proxy, the public as a whole. Though the reforms aimed to reduce this type
of authoritarian directive, the fact remains that the Communist Party was, at
this early stage of reform, still accepted as the representative of all citizens; a
piece of the Stalinist legacy.
Outside of Gorbachev’s own speeches, other high-ranking individuals were
commonly featured in Soviet Life writing about the necessity for restructuring
and outlining how their fields would be affected. Many of these individuals are
academics and professors, primarily from the fields of economics and sociology.
As leading scholars in their fields, they are utilizing their titles and positions to
add weight and authority to their interpretations. Doctor of Economics from
the Central Economic and Mathematical Institute of the USSR Academy of
Sciences Natalya Rimashevskaya is featured as writing, “the program provides for
improving working conditions and remuneration, increasing the consumption
fund, giving more assistance to large families, reviewing pension arrangements
and retail prices, improving housing conditions and health services, and further
developing education, culture, art and the mass media.”272 Sociologist Tatyana
Zaslavskaya, also a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, is featured
several times in Soviet Life throughout the Gorbachev period. Her assessments
concern the development of society as a whole, rather than specific economic
270
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goals. In a March 1988 interview with Soviet Life, Zaslavskaya is asked if she as
a sociologist can guarantee that perestroika will be successful in bringing about
positive changes for the Soviet Union. She answers, “The result will depend on
the choice of virtually every member of society…a consistent democratization
of all spheres of public life is under way—a process that could become the main
factor of success.”273 The open support of academics like Rimashevskaya and
Zaslavskaya is crucial to the public mobilization behind perestroika. As experts
in their respective fields, their statements are received with more credibility by
the public.
More meaningful for foreign audiences who may not necessarily be influenced by Soviet politicians and academics are the experiences of people
who are on the ground experiencing the changes themselves. Well aware of
the distrust many Westerners felt towards anyone directly associated with the
Soviet government, Soviet Life printed articles by friendly, relatable individuals
lending indirect support to the government programs through the reporting of
their everyday observations. While they may not hold official titles or positions
of importance, accounts from these individuals, especially when published in
a magazine like Soviet Life can be considered vertical propaganda. They are
directed from someone who can be considered “in the know” in relation to
foreign readers that have no tangible connection to the reforms taking place.
An example of this type of vertical propaganda can be found in the October
1987 piece “Moscow-Center of Change”.274 Mike Davidow, an individual
given no formal introduction and taking a familiar tone, relays his observations of perestroika Moscow. Davidow lauds the vibrancy of the local bazaars,
noting how full of life everyone is and the festive atmosphere surrounding the
community. He writes that this jubilant affair is the direct result of the fact
that collective farms and co-ops are now allowed to sell their surplus products
independently (a piece of the perestroika reforms) and are thus alleviating the
food shortages that once plagued the city.275 Davidow’s claims are substantiated
by the fact that he is on the scene, bearing witness to the changes in progress.
Works such as Davidow’s act as support for the politicians, policy makers, and
academics that promised such improvements would occur.
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Irrational vs. Rational Propaganda: Ideals Put into Action
Ellul differentiates pieces propaganda into two more classes based the type
of appeals they use to encourage action: irrational and rational. Irrational
propaganda is made to excite the audience, speaking with great passion and
emotion often about lofty ideals or principles with no statistical grounding.276
Rational propaganda on the other hand, makes heavy use of facts, figures and
statistics to appeal to the man’s favorable view of verifiable information and
illustrate the successes or failures of a course of action.277 Here, it is important
to again emphasize that propaganda need not be lies. A piece of propaganda
may be 100% factual information, but conveyed in a manner that demands
support and action.
The propaganda of perestroika and glasnost contains both rational and irrational elements, revealing the comprehensive nature of their goals. Irrational
pieces make use of concepts like democracy, social justice, and promises of a
new age in the Soviet Union. The rational pieces use statistics and reports to
underscore where the past system has fallen short, and illuminate where the
new course has been successful. Utilized together, these two types of appeals
paint a picture of a society undergoing a complete transformation of ideology
and infrastructure. The irrational and the rational support each other—one
laying out the ideological basis of the reforms, the other providing tangible and
calculable evidence of their necessity and successes.
Given the ideological shifts that perestroika and glasnost were working
towards, irrational propaganda served to excite the public with ideals of the
inherent “goodness” of the new system. One theme that is featured quite
often is that of social justice. The idea of a just and moral society in which
social conditions do not limit opportunity or the ability to achieve one’s goals
is upheld as a proud Soviet tradition, albeit one that is still being perfected and
brought to a reality.278 The attainment of social justice and equality is lifted
up as the supreme goal of reform. Readers are assured that the actions taking
place before them have this in mind, and that the Communist Party will do
everything it can to advance the principle.279
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Perestroika was made to look appealing in that it was to usher in a new age
of prosperity and socialist enlightenment. It was throwing off the shackles of
previous ideological stagnation, and proceeding with the development of new
ideas in light of modern realities. One individual who made this claim very
clear was Boris Krotkov, editor-in-chief of Sputnik. At the beginning of each
issue, Krotkov writes a letter to his readers giving his (and consequently, the
Party’s) take on the current state of affairs in the Soviet Union. His style is a
perfect example of irrational propaganda, promising a brighter future in the
wake of reform. “We want more socialism. But we need socialism constantly
renovating, capable of being in the vanguard of human civilization...and not
for some abstract prestige, but for the sake of each and every one [sic.] of us.
For the sake of me, my children and grandchildren, their bright future, the
road to which was opened by the October Revolution.”280 Krotkov offers no
specifics, rather relying on the broad appeal of a promising tomorrow shaped
by ideological developments.
Though emotional appeals such as Krotkov’s are quite common in material
emerging from this period, there are an even greater number of pieces with a
focus on justifying perestroika with hard facts and statistics. Wage levels, industrial production statistics, and efficiency reports are among the vast number
of figures thrown at readers in these types of articles. These reflect the fact that a
major portion of perestroika’s reforms were economic, and as such, changes could
be quantified and judged accordingly. Problems with past economic planning
were accompanied with the statistic that the industrial output growth rate in
1982 was 50% below the average of the growth rate for the previous five-year
planning period.281 The economics of the Uzbek Republic were cast in a dismal
light by listing that industrial capacity had been underused for the preceding
20 years, leaving goals for growth rates and economic targets unmet.282 A 60%
decline in the growth of the national income of the USSR from 1971-1986
was noted, naturally alongside calls for change.283 These numerical revelations
direct readers to one conclusion: the old system has failed. When the ideology
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and policy no longer produce quantifiable success, people are bound to seek
an alternative—namely, perestroika.
The economic effects of perestroika, or rather the state of the economy
during the perestroika reforms, were also made public via statistics. Surely,
readers are to believe, any improvements in production or efficiency could
be attributed to the numerous changes brought about in economic policy.
Industrial production is listed as having increased by 4.4% and agricultural
production by 3% between 1985 and 1986.284 Use of “progressive” technologies was to be expanded by 50-100%.285 These statistics are not published to
be remembered by readers. What is important is the overall impression they
create. With growth numbers positive and goals set high for the future, readers
gather that things must be looking up, paying no mind to what “progressive”
technologies may be or just how closely the recorded growth rates correspond
with previous plans. What is remembered is that they were shown numbers,
and that the numbers looked promising.
The scope of the perestroika and glasnost reforms is much better understood
when utilizing the framework of rational vs. irrational propaganda. Both types
were featured heavily, representing the multi-faceted nature of the reforms
themselves. On one hand, there was to be a massive shift in ideology, bringing
about a new era of justice and prosperity. On the other, these ideas were to be
concrete, manifesting themselves in improved production that could be seen
on paper or in the factories.
Lenin and Stalin as Symbols
While Ellul is careful to establish that propaganda is not solely the manipulation of symbols for a psychological effect, he stipulates that symbols can be
manipulated within a propaganda system to provoke action.286 In order for a
symbol to be manipulated effectively, it must first be ingrained within a society. Once the symbol has been properly established and elevated through the
pre-education of a society, it can be called upon to serve the purposes of the
propagandist.287 The manipulation of revered or hated concepts or individuals
“On the Party’s Tasks in Fundamentally Restructuring the Management of the Economy,”
in Soviet Life, September 1987: SI.
285
Ryzhkov, “Nikolai Ryzhkov,” 21.
286
Ellul, Propaganda, 20-23.
287
Ibid., 31.
284

106

Matthew Brown

provokes reflexive actions in those who have been taught to feel a certain way
about them.
Within the Soviet Union, there was no symbol more respected than that of
Vladimir Lenin. The architect of the October Revolution, Lenin’s status was
elevated to that of an immortal sage, accessible through his writings and his
embalmed body that rests in its Red Square mausoleum.288 The cult of Lenin
is something unmatched in Western society. During the October Revolution
and following his death, Lenin grew from being a political theorist into an
abstraction of all that was possible for the people of the Soviet Union.289 The
veneration of Lenin was by no means consistent in its intensity. However, it
endured usurpation and corruption by the personality cult of Josef Stalin, was
revitalized to an extent by Nikita Khrushchev, only to again be relegated to
half-heartedly celebrated state holidays in the following decades.290 Though
the Soviet concept of Lenin was not always at the forefront of political life, it
managed to maintain its character relative to the revolution and the benevolent
and all-wise status Lenin was elevated to. The enduring power of Lenin as a
symbol of the purity of his ideology and goodwill in the Soviet Union made
his identity and the myths surrounding him a natural target for manipulation.
The possibility of using Lenin as a symbol was by no means ignored by
proponents of the perestroika and glasnost reforms. Once again, Lenin was
used to justify the new course of action proposed for the Soviet Union; his writings being cited as a source of inspiration for reform and new policies labeled
as a continuation of his work. All Soviet citizens were imbibed with a deep
appreciation and respect for Lenin’s accomplishments and theories, and aligning one’s platform with that of Lenin was a sure method to achieve a reflexive
action from the public.
A piece of Leninist theory that proved vital to the promoters of perestroika
was the view that society must adapt to practical realities, updating its approaches
to face issues that previous theorists, Lenin included, could not possibly foresee.
Gorbachev’s use of a Lenin quote is explained in a Soviet Life piece when he
repeated, “’When the situation has changed and different problems have to be
Nina Tumarkin, Lenin Lives!: The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1983), xi.
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solved, we cannot look back and attempt to solve them by yesterday’s methods.
Don’t try—you won’t succeed.’”291 With this general notion justifying the drive
toward reform, other more specific elements of Lenin’s writing and life were used
to direct the changes. The openness and critical nature of glasnost could be
aligned with Lenin’s claim that “our strength lies in stating the truth,” and the
war against bureaucracy justified by the importance Lenin placed on reducing
bureaucracy in times that were see great changes.292 These congruencies were
not held to be coincidences, nor should they be. They represent an attempt to
return to classical Leninist theories uncorrupted by the Stalinist system, and
updating them as per Lenin’s own advice. Using Lenin as a symbol was not
simply an attempt to gain public support for a new course, but the result of a
society that had been conditioned to look to him for answers. In Gorbachev’s
own words, “It is precisely…in Lenin’s spirit that we acted at our congress. It
is precisely in this way that we are going to act in the future as well.”293
While Lenin was used as a symbol of pursing a progressive socialist society
through reinterpretation and creative thinking, the image of Stalin was utilized
to personify the ills that faced the Soviet Union at the time of reform. We have
already established the general character of Stalin’s additions to the Soviet system,
and this history was not lost on Gorbachev and the other reformers. There were
few in the Soviet Union whose families were not harmed by Stalinism.294 In
the propaganda of the late 1980s, Stalin’s influence was typically portrayed as
repressive, centralizing, and instrumental in bringing about the authoritarian
management system that was to be reformed (a valid representation, as established in earlier sections).295 “The vast majority of deviations from socialism,
many of which have not yet been overcome, emerged in Stalin’s time…Stalinism
implies mass terror, contempt for human life, the massacre of millions of innocent people on political grounds.”296 While it is historical fact that Stalin
did shape the Soviet Union in this way, the real interest lies in how Stalin was
directly associated with the problems reformers were facing. By directly linking the pre-perestroika system to Stalin and his legacy of terror, these pieces
create the reflexive desire to distance oneself from the old ways. In the West,
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where Stalin is usually depicted as the ultimate evil of the Soviet Union, this
correlation had potential to be very successful in winning the support of many
Americans.
The combination of Lenin (an already revered figure) as a symbol of correct
socialist ideology and Stalin (feared and hated by many in the Soviet Union
and abroad) as the source of socioeconomic ills reveals an interesting side of
the perestroika and glasnost reforms. The reforms seized upon the collective
senses of success and failure. Reformers recognized where they believed their
country had deviated from its founding principles, and turned their focus to
the success of Lenin’s October Revolution as a way of mitigating the damage
and continuing on what they believed to be the correct path. The propaganda
reflecting this duality of Soviet leadership was not a planned out tactic as more
rudimentary studies may conclude, but an organic result of the social fabric
and history of the Soviet Union at the time.
Changing Coverage: No Direction but Down
As the Soviet Union continued down the labored and uncertain path towards
democratization, there are certain shifts visible within the content of Soviet Life
and Sputnik. The materials presented in the publications drifted farther from
the criteria used to define propaganda. Beginning in 1989 and lasting through
the official dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, articles being
to appear that do not contain the same drive towards action found in earlier
pieces. Rather than suggesting a correct path or reassuring the population that
the present hardships are in the service of future benefits, questions about the
future of the Soviet Union are brought up and left open-ended. The questioning
of reforms begins somewhat modestly, but as time goes on the dissatisfaction
intensifies. By early 1991, certain articles openly express distaste with all things
coming from the government with great exasperation.
In December of 1989, Soviet Life printed an article titled “Unemployment:
Avoiding the Pitfalls”.297 The piece almost acts as an introduction to the word
“unemployment” and its implications, as until the perestroika reforms, there
had been full employment in the USSR. The root of the massive levels of
unemployment (primarily in Central Asia and the Caucasus region) is held to
be the self-financing of all factories and plants. The article states that because
these production facilities are no longer state supported, they have reduced
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costs by eliminating superfluous workers. The article goes on to say that if the
Soviet Union desires economic recovery, the “myth” of full employment needs
to be done away with. A question is asked of readers in the final lines: “What
should be done to ease the situation, to avoid pitfalls, and to guarantee and
safeguard our citizens’ right to work?”298
Interestingly, the piece gives no hypothetical solutions. In earlier issues,
this type of question would warrant a lengthy reply, thick with hopes of a better future at the expense of today. However, progress is no longer the task at
hand. The question asks what can be done to ease the situation and safeguard
citizens, not advance their causes. This piece cannot be considered propaganda,
as it does not suggest or lead towards any specific action, but rather asks readers
“what can be done?” It openly labels full employment, previously a key feature
of the Soviet economy and a point of pride, as a “myth.”
Two months later in February 1990, and piece entitled “Socialism: Where
is it headed?” was published in Soviet Life.299 The article begins by praising
the enthusiasm with which Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe have
embraced perestroika and the spirit of change that comes with it. After this
optimistic introduction, the tone of the writing becomes more questioning of
the Soviet Union’s allies. The author, Nikolai Shishlin questions the direction
the countries will go in with their reforms. He lists three possible views on the
further development of “socialist community” within these states. The first is
that socialism is dead and that the only future is in a return to a “bourgeoisdemocratic” system. The second is that socialist democracy will take hold and
that Stalinist interpretations will be defeated. The third possible outcome is that
“revolutionary” changes will take place and “cleanse” the socialist ideal. Shishlin
concludes that all three opinions have the right to exist, that no single course
can be suggested, and that everyone should be prepared for more unpleasant
surprises. Finally, he ends by making an appeal to the right of free choice of
government and encourages cooperation.
This type of writing would be completely alien in Soviet Life were it published
a year earlier. Even entertaining the fact that socialism may be dead without
responding with a voracious attack on all possible angles would be next to sacrilege. Like the article before it, this one makes no suggestion as to the course
the states it discusses should take. Granted, it does call for cooperation and
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freedom to choose one’s own government, but these goals presented without
the ideological components of previous pieces are nothing more than a hope
for any form of stability.
Representing the most extreme move away from the classification of propaganda is an article written by Yuri Grafsky titled “In Search of an Economic
Strategy.”300 Printed in the February 1991 edition of Soviet Life (1991 was the
final year Soviet Life would be published), the article takes a scathing tone,
renouncing all government efforts to improve the economic situation. Grafsky
compares the promises of Gorbachev to the failed promises made by Josef
Stalin, stating “in recent years ordinary Soviet citizens have been showered with
promises of social boons.”301 He ties any increase in wages or pension amounts
to the government’s willingness to print huge amounts of currency to satisfy
promised increases, which are rendered moot by the inflation this behavior
inevitably leads to. He discusses with tangible levels of disgust the waffling of
various government bodies as they struggle to come up with a working plan of
any type to save the economy, revealing the contradictory nature of the policies adopted at that time. He closes by saying, “The Soviet economy moves
according to the principle, ‘One step forward, two steps back.’”302
Clearly, the transformation is complete. Socialist ideology is never even
mentioned in this article. No course is proposed, and there is little to no hope
for the future of the economy, and almost no faith left in the government to
solve the problems Grafsky argues it is only making worse with its own ineptitude and indecision. There is no way this government-bashing rant, completely
devoid of hope or any direction for the future, can be considered propaganda;
at least not within the criteria established by Ellul. This absence of propaganda
indicates the absence of the state power Ellul held as necessary for propaganda
to exist. The Soviet Union was effectively done, officially ceasing to exist 10
months following the publication of this article.
What happened?
How could reforms that started out so promising end in the dissolution of one
of the world’s greatest superpowers? At the beginning of the march towards
greater openness and a more fair society, the Soviet Union represented a highly
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centralized, bureaucratic, top-down oriented civilization. In 6 short years, it
would sign itself out of existence. Surely, there must be a way to explain such
a dramatic fall.
We can arrive at one of many possible understandings by utilizing the
theories of Jacques Ellul, as has been done throughout this study. Ellul writes
that propaganda must be rooted in action, and that a failure to take action is
in itself counter-propaganda.303 The failure of the Soviet state to reach the
goals it established for itself was its ultimate downfall. The Communist Party
promoted a new course of action, deeply rooted in Leninist theory and the idea
that the Party is an effective representative of the people. While democratization was indeed achieved, the rest of the package was conspicuously absent.
The economy was in a state of complete ruin, far from the promised consumer
prosperity. The legitimacy of the Party as a guiding force and the traditions
it rested on were called into question and ultimately thrown out by voting
citizens. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, its leaders and experts,
and ideological foundations were rendered impotent and ineffectual in light
of their public failings. The social backbone that the propaganda and reforms
were based on caved in. Elections favored new political parties, and the Soviet
Republics decided, one by one, to pursue their own separate courses of development apart from the Soviet Union, consistent with the nationalist claims made
by post-collapse historians.
The close study of propaganda from this period demonstrates in stark terms
the decline of Soviet state power. From the initial speeches and statistics to
mobilize the masses, to the open rejection of government policy, the collapse
of the state is clear. Ellul’s claim that propaganda represents a powerful state
rings true in this case. As Communist Party supremacy faded, the Soviet print
media’s publications drifted farther and farther away from the characteristics
of propaganda. In a sense, this marks a sort of success the Communist Party
and Gorbachev never intended for. Perestroika and glasnost did indeed finally
de-Stalinize the Soviet Union, but at the cost of the Union itself. Soviet state
power fell victim not only to the general failure of perestroika, but also to its
limited successes.
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